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Bakke: Equity or Equality? -

An Ethical View

David P. Mc Daniels
Campus Minister
Alma College, Michigan

Hard Cases Make Bad Law
Law and ethics are like art o Each consists of
drawing fine lines of distinction which form and inform conflicting claims, describing, inscribing, pre scribing. Both are subject to the judgment made of
art: there is good and bad art. What good art consists of differs from the casual observer to the connoisseur, each balancing perception and preference in
judgments referred to as taste . For the layperson,
good art is often limited to the clear , the distinct,
often simple , easily recognizable, to the whole range
of undifferentiated reactions and responses which
elicit "it feels good" or "I like it o" The connoisseur, on the other hand, may be more inclined to view
particulars and not just "the whole picture," to consider tension as well a s resolve, complexity as well
as simplicity, s ha din g as well as clarity and is more
likely to be able to say why the work of art is pleasing.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Bakke case-as art--offers something for everyone in terms of both
law and ethics o The "taste" of the lai ty--whether pro
Bakke or pro affirmative action--was sated . A decision was achieved; Bakke was admitted and affirmative
action was upheld, though the hope for~arity never
emerged . There is enough complexity, confusion and
tension involved in the case to keep the connoisseur
busy for a long time and to allow for the justification of particular "taste."
At some point the analogy between art, law and
40

ethics and the distinction between laity and professional cease. The issue involved in Bakke is "taste,"
whether simple or sophisticated, and taste is the complex of perceptions and preferences, individual and
social values which, by definition, cannot be neutral.
Law and ethics, in making distinctions, in forming
judgments, reflect "taste" and are not value neutral.
The problem before us is how we resolve primary
value conflicts. In a pluralistic society composed of
competing perceptions and preferences, we seem increasingly to be looking to the law to resolve conflict. To the extent that we do this, "hard cases
make bad law" and Bakke is unsatisfying because nothing having the weight of law has been resolved. However, this same tension does, I will argue, provide
the framework for ethics in a pluralistic society o
In the plethora of writings on the Bakke case,
the presentation of the facts of fhe case and the judicial opinions are in agreement.
Consideration of
the ethical issues and the possible conclusions to be
drawn from these follow o
Hard Cases
Allan Bakke is a white male who was graduated
from the University of Minnesota in 1962 with a bachelors degree in engineering. In 1970, he completed a
masters degree in engineering at Stanford and in the
next two years completed the prerequisite courses for
medical school. In 1972, he completed two applications
to medical school, both being rejected o In 1973, 11
medical schools rejected his application. In 1974,
the University of California at Davis rejected Bakke
for the second time, even though his grade point average and MCAT scores were higher than most or all of
the 16 minority applicants who were accepted.
The 16 minority student acceptances at Davis were
part of a separately administered admissions program
for disadvantaged applicants, the Task Force Program.
Regular applications were administered according to a
complex formula of GPA, MCAT, interviews and some
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preferences based on geography or other factors; 84
seats were available in this program.
When Bakke was denied admission to Davis for the
second time, he sued in the California state courts,
alleging violation of the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment, a similar provision in the California Constitution and Title VI of Civil Rights Act
of 1964, arguing that because he was not elligible for
all 100 seats, his civil rights had been violated .
The trial court upheld Bakke's claim on all three
grounds , yet made his admission to Davis contingent on
his own proof that he would have been admitted had it
not been for the set-aside program. Upon Bakke's appeal to the California Supreme Court, the Davis program was found to be invalid as a violation of the
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but neither
Title VI nor the state provision were referred to.
Significantly, in the trial court opinion, Bakke had
to prove that he would have been admitted were it not
for the set-aside, whereas the State Supreme Court
shifted the burden of proof to Davis; i.e., the University had to prove that he would not have been admitted in the absence of the Task Force Program . Davis
could not comply and was ordered to admit Bakke.
The University of Ca lifornia at Davis appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court and the order to admit Bakke
was stayed when the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the case in February 1977, The Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari was important, had it refused to hear the case, the California decision would
have stood, threatening all affirmative action pro grams o The case was heard in October 1977, with the
Court delaying a decision pending additional briefs
on the applicability of Title VI o
While awaiting the next hearing of the case, the
Supreme Court received more than SO briefs amicus
curiae, including the brief filed by the United States
in qualified support of Davis, The U.S. brief argued
that it is permissible to have minority-sensitive ad missions programs, but said that the record in this
case was not clear enough to establish whether the
Davis program met or transgressed the permissible,
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The Supreme Court handed down its decision in
June 1978,
o Make Bad Law
Only two paragraphs written by Justice Powell
constitute the full Bakke decision o All else is of
minority opinion and had no force of law and had little
value for setting precedent o
While Powell's short
opinion determines the majority position, it should be
noted that each paragraph of his opinion is supported
by a non-overlapping group of four justices. On paper,
the Supreme Court opinion appears to be four to four
with one justice (Powell) agreeing with portions of
each side (4-1-4), though technically the decision is
5-4 0 In addition to Powell's two paragraphs, the
court action consists of ten pages of factual background information, with which only five justices
concur! Six minority opinions were written in the
case, each supported by from one to four justices,
and occupying some 140 pages.
The two guiding documents for the Court decision
were Title VI, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They re ad as fol lows:

(Title VI) No person in the United State s
shall, on the grounds of r ace , color or
national or igin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to di s crimination under
any pr ogram or activity r eceiving feder al financial ass i s tance .
(l4th Amendment) Nor shall any s tate . .
deny to any pers on within its juris diction t he equal pr ot ection of the laws .
Presentation of Court action will follow th at given by
the American Council of ~ducation and the Association
of American Law Schools.
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The six opinions delivered in the case may be
summed up in three principal opinions: (1) on e by
Justice Stevens (joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Steward and Rehnquist), (2) one by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun (with the latter
three writing separate opinions) and (3) the majority
opinion of Justice Powell.
(1) The Stevens group, following a long tradition of the Court to settle litigation on the basis of
statute rather than the constitution whenever possible,
dealt with the case in light of Title VI . For this
group there was only a single issue, i . e., whether
Bakke should have been admitted to the Davis medical
school, Race-conscious programs in general were not
examined by this group; only the particulars of Allan
Bakke's admission were viewed. Justice Stevens concluded that Davis' special admissions program excluded
Bakke from participation in its medical education because of race and that Davi s was receiving federal
funding. "The plain language of the statute (Title
VI) therefore, requires affirmance of the judgment"
4
(of the California Supreme Court).
Differing from Powell, Stevens wrote, "It is
therefore perfectly clear that the question whether
race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions
decision is not an issue in this case, a~d that discussion of that issue is inappropriate."
The constitutional issue of the use of race in general in
admissions was not considered. Other affirmative action programs are not addressed beyond the particulars
of the Davis program . Nor is there an indication as
to which features of the Davis program were invalid.

The Ste vens opinion thus may be read narr owly as applying only in the context of
t he University 's concession t hat it could
"not meet t he burden of proving that the
special admis sions pr ogram did not re su lt
in Bakke 's exclus ion ." 6
(2) The Brennan group saw Title VI and the equal
protection clause as being the same. Use of race as a
characteristic distinguishing a person or group con44

stitutes a "suspect classification" and as such, must
be rigorously reviewed as to its constitutionality,
L e., it receives "strict scrutiny." To withstand
strict scrutiny, the use of a suspect classification
(race) "must be proved necessary to the accomplishment
of some permissible state objective, independent of
raci a l discrimination which i~ was the object of the
14th Amendment to eliminate o"
The method chosen to
effect an action must also be shown to be the most
effective and rational alternative.
The Brennan group hel d that the demand for strict
scrutiny could be met and race-conscious admissions
programs would be valid if they satisfied a threepronged test: First,

a s tate government may adopt race- cons cious
pr ograms if the purpos e of s uch programs is
to remove the dis parate racial impact its
actions might otherwise have and if there
i s reas on to believe that the di sparate impact i s its elf t he pr oduct of pas t di s crimination, whether its own or that of society
at lar ge .
Secondly, a racial admissions criterion must be "reasonably used in light of the programs' objectives . .
" Finally, race-consciousness must not be used in
a way that "stigmati zes any discrete group or indivd8
ual."
Brennan was satisfied that the three-pronged test
had been met o Disparate racial impact due to past
discrimination was established on the ba sis of statistical data showing minority underrepresentation in
the medical profession and pervasive racial discrimination which resulted in lower academic achievement
by minority students, The special admissions program
(including the ide a of quotas) was seen a s a reasonable affirmative effort to correct past discrimination
as well in that it both served the programs' objective s and did not stigmatize, i.e., use of race was
limited to admission and did not involve sep ar ate programs once students were admitted,
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A short quote from three justices in this group
provides a flavor of their findings:

Government must take race into account when
it acts not to demean or insult any racial
group, but to remedy disadvantages cas t on
minorities by pas t racial prejudice, at
leas t when appropriate finding s have been
made by judicial, legis lative or administrative bodies with competence to act in
this area .
Brennan
. . . during the most of the past 200 years
the Cons titution as interpreted by this
Court did not prohibit the most ingenious
and pervasive forms of discrimination
against the Negro . Now , when a state acts
to remedy the effects of that legacy of
di s crimination, I cannot believe that this
same Constitution stands as a barrier.
Marshall
In order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race . There i s no
other way . And in order to treat some
pers ons equally, we must first treat them
differently . We cannot--we dare not-- let
the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate
racial supremacy .
Blackmun

9

(3) The following two paragraphs quoted from
Justice Powell constitute the full Bakke decision:

For the reas ons s tated in the following
opinion, I believe that so much of the
judgment of the California court as holds
petitioner ' s (University of California)
s pecial admis s ions program unlawful and
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directs that respondent (Allan Bakke ) be
admitted t o the Medical School must be
affirmed. For the reas ons express ed in a
s eparate opinion, my Brothers, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR . JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, and MR . JUSTICE STEVENS concur
in thi s judgment .
I als o conclude for the reasons s tated in
the following opinion that the portion of
the ~ourt ' s judgment enjoining petitioner
from according any consideration to race
in its admissions process must be revers ed.
For reasons expressed in separate opinions,
my Brothers, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR . JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR . lO
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concur in this judgment .
I will now try to explain how we divided on this issue, It may not be self-evident.
--Powell
The first paragraph of Powell's opinion supports
the conclusion of the Steven's group, Le., Allan
Bakke was discriminated against. Yet, significantly,
he differs as to interpretation. For Stevens, any use
of race violates Title VI in federal programs and is
invalid. Powell's second paragraph will not all ow him
to accept so sweeping a judgment as regards r ace-conscious programs, and, therefore, his judgment in support of Bakke's claim is for different reasons. For
Powell, the special admissions program a t Davis was
invalid, i.e., it discriminated against Bakke, because
it established a two-track system for admission . Because Bakke could not compete for 16 seats, the program was discriminatory.
However, it was not the use of race-conscious ad missions which formed the objection. It was the setaside of a "quota" which excluded Bakke, Race and
ethnic background may be taken into accoun t in the admissions p rocess, a lon g with other relevant factors,
so long as the "program treats each applicant as an
47

individual in the admissions process. 1111 That is, in
addition to the standard quantified data in the person's file, subjective factors may be taken into consideration so long as this is the case for each student . Accordingly one's race, overcoming racial ad versity, etc o, may be considered a "plus" for an in dividual (along with other widely used subjective
criteria such as leadership ability, extra curricular
activity, geographical preference, being a football
player or the child of an alumnus).
The principle of race-conscious programs was affirmed in Powell's second paragraph. However, again,
he differed from the concurring justices as to rationale. The Brennan group had approved Davis ' plan as
reasonable to redress the lingering effects of past
discrimination. In Davis' brief, four objectives were
given in justification of race-conscious programs .
That cited by the Brennan group was included along
with (1) reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the
medical profession; (2) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved; and (3) obtaining the educational benefits t~at flow from an ethnically diverse student
body.
Only the last reason--the advantage of ethnic diversity in a s tudent body--survived Justice Powell's
scrutiny. He stated that this goal was constitutionally permissable, supported by 1st Amendment values
embodied in the concept of academic freedom, and that
for educational reasons, ethnic diversity proved a
compelling government interest . The admissions pro gram and objectives of Harvard University were quoted
at length as an example of a permissable affirmative
action proposal.
Interpretation and Implications
The surface of the Bakke decision is clear:
Bakke's claims of discrimination against him were up held and affirmative action in forms other than the
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quota system were validated. Beyond this, due to the
complexity of the three group decision, compounded by
six written opinions, with the conflict presented by
opinions agreeing in principle or conclusion but disagreeing in rationale or method, more questions are
raised than answers given o Little by way of direction
is added o There is no certainty that a look-alike
case will be decided in the same way.
The Stevens group did not deal with the constitutional issue of the use of race as a classification.
In its specific reference to the Davis program relating
to Bakke, nothing was said about other forms of affirmative action. Even its use of Title VI is questioned; heretofore the statute had not been used to
defend individuals against discrimination in a federally funded project but rather was used by the government (HEW) against programs which were discriminatory.
Whether the other justices in another suit would use
Title VI in this manner is unsettled. Further, no indication is given as to what a valid program of affirmative action might consist of, nor is any mention
made of private non-federally supported affirmative
action programs.
The Brennan group would allow the use of quotas
to remedy areas shown to have been discriminatory in
the past. Yet no advice is given as to how discrimination is determined, and, by inference from minority
opinions, this redress only applies to the suspect
classification of race and not sex or ethnic origin.
That affirmative action is used to make up for past
discrimination poses a constitutional problem: when
has due consideration for the past been made?
Powell tips the scale from side to side. He
agrees that a constitutional issue is involved; that
Bakke was discriminated against (though for reasons
different from Stevens); that affirmative action and
the use of race is permissable (though differing from
Brennan in the use of quotas and with respect to compensation for past discrimination). However, Powell
examines no affirmative action programs other than
Davis and Harvard, and there are many. He doesn't say
whether the four reasons given by Davis in support of
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special admissions might be valid in another program.
Indeed, he allows room for making up for past discrimination if a proper body (legislative or judicial)
judges a program to have been discriminatory in the
past, thereby creating the possibility that a state
legislature could mandate affirmative action even in a
federally funded program and perhaps according to a
quota o How and to what extent race may be used as a
plus in admissions is left to the good will of the institution o What other relevant data may be used in
admissions , how and to what extent can this data be
used and how is that data to be evaluated? These are
major questions which remain unanswered .
The strengths of the Court decision are: (1) it
resolved doubts about race-conscious admissions programs . Five justices viewed it as permissible while
the Stevens group did not speak to the issue. One
track systems, utilizing race as one factor among
others, are permissible on an individual basis; (2) it
meets general approval in an emotion laden subject-each side may claim some support from the decision and
each may lay claim to "victory"; (3) the question as
to how and how much race can be taken into account is
left to each educational community; affirmative action
is neither mandated nor required--it is allowed.
While a ll positions advanced by the Justices have
substantial historical /phi losophical/jurisprudential
precedent, none is clearly mandated by the Constitution. Many unresolved constitutional/philosophical
questions remain.
(1) Is the Constitution "color blind"? Does it
read civil rights cases from the Reconstruction Act,
to Plessy vs o Ferguson, to Brown vs. Board of Education, to Sweat vs o Painter, to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to be moving in the direction of "color blindness,"
i.e o, " all men are created equal," or are these to be
read as supportive of affirmative action?
(2) Does the Constitution condemn discrimination
per se, or does it just condemn invidious discrimination?

so

(3) How does the Constitution resolve the conflict between individual rights and the social good?
Is one's approach to the Constitution to be that of a
hired gun (charged to defend the client) or that of a
social engineer (setting matters of social, political,
moral policy)?
(4) Is the Constitution a value or an end in itself or does it point towards values that go beyond
the letter of the law? How does it resolve a conflict
of basic values when either could be validated constitutionally?
These philosophical questions are fundamental to
resolving the Constitutional questions posed by affirmative action. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Bakke presents no clear majority opinion useable for
guidance of specific affirmative action proposals,
nor does it answer the philosophical questions about
the use of the Constitution.
Hard Cases Make Bad Law
To the extent that we expect law to refine, define, clarify, to set precedent and to mandate policy
and action, the decision in Bakke makes for bad law .
Yet, DID WE REALLY WANT LAW TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THIS
CASE? I think NOT . The Court's lack of decisiveness
created a climate of tension in which justice may be
pursued at all levels, where policy can be further
explored and where the burden of addressing r ace, sex,
ethnicity and other suspect classifications is not
lifted from our shoulders, but responsibility for it
is laid upon individuals and institutions and each is
to be held accountable in the public forum "
At this point, the known has been stated: the
facts have been recalled, the constitutional and
statutory guides set out, the courts' opinions have
been spelled out. What conclusions are possible have
been stated, questions needing to be raised have been
asked.
What is left is AMBIGUITY, LOOPHOLES .
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From this

point on, we are back to the issue of "taste"--perception and preference a The "scholarly" juggling act is
set in motion. Each successive writer will find ways
(on paper) to justify taste and support it with precedent, pending the next court action; and th at brings
us to ethics.
Ethics:

Individualism and Free Enterprise

Taste, as pe rc ept i on and preference, is going to
dictate the words we use. While one will talk of reverse discrimination, bias, preference, quotas and
equality, the other will speak of reversing discrimination, race-consciousness, minority-sensitive, goals
and timetables and equity. Language betrays taste.
The fundamental issue emerges: individualism and free
enterprise confront group or social consciousness and
affirmative action.
What was on trial in Bakke are two modes of being
or acting in society--concern for the individual in
tension with the demand for social justice. On trial
is affirmative action, redress for discrimination, advantage created for one classification of people to
the disadvantage of another a On trial, also, are two
fundamental American values, individualism and free
enterprise--the rights accorded to an individual who
is afforded social, political, economic and educational
mobility through merit.
From the position of ethics, I want to argue the
case for social justice. To do so, I need to talk
about individualism and merit. Bakke's suit against
the Regents of California rests on both. Bakke--as an
individual--was denied admission because of a program
designed Cin the eyes of Davis) for social good. Regarding merit, Bakke was more qualified for admission
than at least some of the 16 minority students, though
it is not often pointed out that 36 white students admitted had lower quantitative admissions scores.
If access to higher education and, in turn, to
professional practice were based on equality of all
applicants and merit, minority positions in higher
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education would be few and far between. Based on objective quantifiable merit--GPA, MCAT, LSAT--minor i ty
scores are significantly lower nationally than whites,
blacks scoring an average of 100 points lr3s on the
LSAT and 102-127 points less on the MCAT.
If these
were the benchmark criteria for admission, few minority
students would be competitive applicants o What do
these meritocratic indices tell us? They tell us th a t
academic performance of non-minority students was
higher in the past; that as predictors, merit scores
are reasonably successful in assessing potential performance o They do not tell us that the 100+ points is
below the minimum advised, Totally unqualified students are not admitted to schools of medicine and law,
Nor do the indices predict failure--only 2 percent of
black students flunked out of professional schools
during the last ten years. Most importantly, merit
doesn't tell us anything about innate ability (only
current performance), or about drive , motivation, persistence or predict professional sy~cess o Nor can it
measure without substantial error.
While I would not question the utility of quantified measurement in admissions, I would seriously question an overly heavy reliance. If admissions were
based solely on merit, only 40 percent of the blacks
and 60 p cent of the Chicanos would have been admitted
15 If people are to be afforded the dignity,
in 1976 .
integrity and value we say they are worth, then there .
is a need to go beyond meritocracy in admissions to
16
discover reliable ways to assessing "soft data,"
a
fact known to ETS. Even with a ffirmative a ction programs, minority enrollment in medical schools is only
8 percent today, 4 perc ~t less than the AAMC goal of
1
12 percent set in 1970 ,
The ethical perspective must que stion what seems
to be an unwritten operational assumption, i.e., only
numerical indices such as grades and standardi zed tests
can measure quality, p rit, individua l worth or poten8 Overdependence on merit merely
tial for performance o
covers up for lack of administrar~ve effort rationalized by cost-benefit analysis,
When "soft data"
is taken into account creatively and conscientiously,
the dangers of meritocracy are avoided, especially in
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light of the strict scrutiny of the law.
"Soft data" allows room for equity--perhaps not
for equality. While the language of law calls for
equality, simple, honest observation, allows one to
conclude that all is not equal, especially with respect to admissions. Inequality, built into the very
fabric of our past and present society prevents us
from treating all as equals (according to merit?) or
privilege and access to opportunity will largely remain with the privileged o Concern for social justice
prevents us from using the "equality" standard. We
may instead strive for equity, treating each individua l
as a whole person utilizing both hard and soft criteria. This is to say that we can personalize opportunity o It may take some inequality to become equal
. o
but only with respect to merit.
O

Justice:

Equity not Equality

Aris to t le s uccumbed t o Pythagor ean inf luence which pr omis cuous ly commi ngled
mathematics and ethics (when he said) :
"A U Men t~bnk jus t i ce to be a sort of
equali t y . 11
If we can admit the present need for equity and
not equality, then we can look forward to a more complete notion of j ust~re' as the "fundamental category
of social existence"
rather than equality. Indi vidualism can no longer be above, but must be alongside
of the claims of social justice and equality broadens
to include corrective inequality o
Justice is tripartite--rendering minimal due in
three respects: (1) it regulates relations between
individuals (commutative justice); (2) it regulates
relations between individuals and the common good
(social justice); and (3) it regulates social 1 encies
2
in dispensing of goods (distributive justice).
Given the tripartite notion of justice, the claims of
the individual (eg. Bakke) take their place alongside
of and in tension with social justice and distributive
justice o
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The tension created by the Sup r eme Court decision
in Bakke and the legacy of that lit i gation create the
form for a just society .
Towards a Litigious Society?

Justice Not Law!

Three major methods are available for doing
ethics: the good, the right and the fitting (corresponding to teleological, deontological and situational
ethics). Each has been used to dete rmine and justify
action in and of itself. Each has severe limitations
when used extensively or exclusively. Ethical relativism results from shifting from one method to another on a case by case basis . Diff erent individuals
or groups reflecting on the same issue but from different methods and plugging in competing values gives
our culture the character of ethica l pluralism.
As stated in the introduction, ethical pluralism
accounts for conflicting values and social tension.
To ease moral, social and political tension, our culture has turned increasingly to lit i gation for answers: we have become an increasingl y litigious so c iety. To do so is to confuse or bypass necessary steps
for doing ethics in a pluralistic society. Looking at
the three categories of ethics, the good may be seen
as that which may legislate and enforce what is good
for society, the right is that which forms the value
base for litigating the good and the fitting takes
into account the particulars of a given situation.
When looking at a particular situation (Bakke)
while expecting the courts to determine policy (the
good), w~ lose sight of the right (justice in the tripartite sense as the basis of law). The litigious
society repl a ces the values of the right with the process of determining the good . Law becomes equated
with justice, the Constitution (which binds the Court)
becomes the value itself. The appropriate ethical
method for our day is to maintain t he full tension
between the right (justice) and the particular s i tuation (the fitting). Within this tension, the struggle
for the good (the law) is not an an swer, but a mediating part of the process .
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The right is not carved unambiguously in stone,
The situation changes by the moment. The law (Con stitution) cannot be rigid and inflexible in mediating
the tension. From the ethical point of view, Bakke
was handled correctly o The principle of justice was
applied to a particular situation without becoming
cannonized in law o
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